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ABSTRACT
, Healthcare fraud is a major problem within the 
healthcare industry. The study examined this problem. The 
study examined medical fraud, its laws, and punishments on 
federal and state levels. It compared medical fraud to 
non-fraud crimes done in the healthcare industry. This 
comparison will be done on a state level. The study 
attempted to analyze the severity of fraud against non­
fraud and that doctors would commit fraud offenses more 
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During the 1930s President Herbert Hoover created the 
Committee on the Costs of Medical Care (CMCC). This was 
the forefather to the Medicaid Program created in 1965. 
Ever since programs like Medicaid and Medicare have been 
around healthcare physicians have tried to defraud them. 
Numerous laws such as the Medicaid False Claims Statute and 
the Stark Amendments have been passed to fight fraud but 
the problem doesn't have an end in sight. Individual 
states have also passed their own laws to keep healthcare 
professionals from taking advantage of the system. At the 
same time though, officials at the state and federal levels 
also combat non-fraud healthcare crimes such as negligence 
and incompetence.
Statement of Problem
Skeen (2003) states that health care is the number-one 
industry in the country. It is estimated that by 2011 
health care spending will reach 2.8 trillion dollars thus 
making up 17% of the Gross Domestic Product (Schreiber, 
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Prasow, & Martin, 2002). With the healthcare industry 
increasing in monetary profit the industry is being 
attacked by individuals. The problem that the proposed 
study will look at is healthcare fraud. Schreiber, Prasow, 
and Martin (2002) state that fraud takes in 10% of total 
expenditures for health care and costs taxpayers up to $100 
billion a year. The problem is not only one of national 
concern but of state concern as well.
States have their laws and codes to attack fraud as 
well. Even though laws have been created and passed to 
fight fraud on federal and state levels the problem seems 
to have no end. In order for the nation to take a hit 
financially the problem has to start with the state. It 
has to be asked if the states are doing enough to stop 
fraud before it reaches a point to where the nation is 
going to suffer for it.
Purpose of the Study
The study is significant because it attempts to draw 
comparisons between healthcare fraud and non-fraud related 
crimes in the healthcare industry. By doing this, the 
study will attempts to examine how closely related 
punishments for fraud and non-fraud crimes are. The study
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will then examine that relationship in order to see if 
enough is being done on a state level to decrease the fraud 
problem. By examining the punishments the study examined 
if punishments need to be harsher for fraud related crimes 
on the state level.
Limitations of the Study
Limitations to the study were that a database had to 
be created from existing statistics. These statistics were 
only as good as the data used to create them. Other 
limitations that the study faced is in the sample. Only a 
certain group of physicians were used for the study. The 
existing data will come from California only thus only 
giving a California perspective of the problem. This means 
that federal laws and punishments will not be the main 





Everyday many people depend on healthcare 
professionals. Many aspects of our lives and health are 
affected by healthcare professionals. Many people, when 
entrusting aspects of their life to others, are not 
thinking of the criminal aspects that could be hiding. 
Crime is commonly thought of as a poor inner-city 
phenomenon in which any crimes committed by the middle-and 
upper- classes either go undetected or unreported. Yet, 
crime does occur in upper and middle classes with medical 
professionals taking a part in crime.
Within the medical field there are laws and codes that 
must be upheld. Sometimes these are broken and punishments 
must be administered. These laws and codes address such 
crimes as medical fraud, negligence, giving wrong 
prescriptions, sexually harassing patients, and giving the 
wrong diagnosis. Punishments for these crimes can be wide 
and various, and sometimes, overlapping. The largest of 
the medical professional crimes is healthcare fraud. 
Medical fraud should not be thought of as other healthcare 
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crimes. It needs to be viewed and punished differently in 
order for the abuse to lessen.
Medicaid-A History
During the 1930s President Herbert Hoover created the
Committee on the Costs of Medical Care (CMCC). This 
committee assessed the health care situation in the United 
States and part of this multivolume assessment dealt 
primarily with low-income people and their efforts in 
trying to procure healthcare. The 1950s saw the rise of 
the Kerr-Mills program which, expanded health care to the 
elderly but failed due to poor funding and structure. It 
did not include the blind, disabled, or poor people with 
dependent children. Along with the Kerr-Mills programs 
came the Medical Assistance to the Aged program (MZXA) . The 
main point of this program focused on states deciding the 
control of costs, specification of program upper limits, 
and a definition of poverty. Like the Kerr-Mills, it too 
failed. Congress finally decided to overhaul the programs 
with a replacement program (Goldfield, 2003).
Started in 1965, Medicaid was enacted through Title IX 
of the Social Security Act. It is designed to provide 
medical assistance to those whose income and resources are 
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insufficient to meet the costs of care and services (Atkins 
v. Rivera, 1986). To qualify for Medicaid one must show 
that he or she is an American citizen or permanent resident 
alien, live in a state where Medicaid benefits are 
available, are aged, blind, or disabled, or the parent of a 
minor as well as being financially needy according to 
Medicaid standards (Bigler, Archer, & Regan, 1993). Like 
other programs set up by the government Medicaid has gone 
through several amendments. Some major changes include the 
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, the Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, and the Supplemental Security 
Income for Aged, Blind, and Disabled (Ahmad, 1999) .
Medicaid is only one part of the United States' health 
care system but it is a primary target of those who wish to 
defraud it. The crimes of health care fraud extend beyond 
Medicaid though. In order to decrease Medicaid fraud it is 
important to know about the different types of health care 
fraud that are committed everyday in the United States.
Healthcare Fraud
Skeen (2003) states that health care is the number-one 
industry in the country. It is estimated that by 2011 
health care spending will reach 2.8 trillion dollars thus 
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making up 17% of the Gross Domestic Product (Schreiber, 
Prasow, & Martin, 2002). With so much money pouring into 
health care it is almost the perfect industry to defraud. 
According to Schreiber, Prasow, and Martin (2002) fraud 
takes in 10% of total expenditures for health care and 
costs taxpayers up to $100 billion a year. The government 
has targeted Medicaid and Medicare as the main targets of 
defrauders within the health care industry. In discussing 
health care fraud the first question asked is why does it 
occur?
The health care system has six characteristics that 
open it up to fraud. First, large amounts of money are 
involved. Second, there are announcements of the money's 
availability. This means that defrauders attack the fee- 
for-service method of payment. Third, there is a lack of 
security in the industry. Davis (1995) states that the 
more investigators there are the larger the case load thus 
making unknown the number of fraud cases that fall through 
the cracks. Fourth, low levels of surveillance create low 
chances for apprehension and punishment. Fifth, people are 
not equally tempted to commit crimes. Some crimes involve 
a certain amount of danger while others, like Medicaid 
fraud is easier and therefore will take advantage of the 
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system. Lastly, "good financial investment is an effective 
way of protecting the money" (Skeen, 2003, p. 518). In 
other words, whatever an agency spends it saves a higher 
amount. This hurts due to the fact that agencies are 
understaffed as stated earlier (Skeen, 2003).
Skeen (2003) further states that due to these six 
characteristics illegal activity can be expected because 
the gain is so high in this industry. First, there is a 
large amount of illegitimate money to be made per offense. 
Secondly, there are no direct costs incurred by the 
offenders because the money is made off the costs. Third, 
the costs can be inflated (Skeen, 2003). Davis (1995) 
states that 90 percent of all hospital bills are wrong, 
while Jesilow, Geis, and Harris (1995) states that the 
errors favor the providers. Billing can be altered up for 
a more expensive service than the one that was done and 
services that were not done can be billed for as well 
(Taylor, 1992).
Fourth, the risk of apprehension is low. Fifth, the 
penalty if convicted usually requires little or no jail 
time, but rather the convicted person has to put the money 
back. Lastly, a person's taste for crime; most crimes are 
risky, health care fraud is not (Skeen, 2003). Ehrlich
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(1996) states that it is very simple to commit an act of 
health care fraud and abuse.
These issues emphasize that there is a problem with 
the Medicaid program. With Medicaid designed to help the 
underprivileged it should not be an easy mark. The 
elderly, blind, and disabled have more than enough to worry 
about than whether or not their program is being taken for 
millions. Of course, anything pertaining to the less 
fortunate is always an easy target only because of 
clientele. The General Accounting Office states that 
Medicaid is fragmented, poorly supervised, and awash in 
public money (Korcok, 1997).
It is the perfect system to defraud. Costs are paid 
by the government which means that the receivers of the 
benefits do not have to worry about how much they have to 
spend and the money is easily accessible by practitioners 
and drug companies (Korcok, 1997).
Deterrence Theory
Healthcare fraud is committed because of the large 
amount of money to be made. Even though this is, there is 
another way to explain why healthcare fraud is committed. 
Deterrence theory is a theory that can be applied as to why 
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medical professionals commit healthcare fraud. Deterrence 
theory, at its core, has three principles. These 
principles are certainty, severity, and celerity of 
punishments (Akers & Sellers, 2004).
Deterrence theory states "...that actions are taken and 
decisions are made by persons in the rational exercise of 
free will. All individuals choose to obey or violate the 
law by a rational calculation of the risk of the pain 
versus potential pleasure derived from an act. In 
contemplating a criminal act, they take into account the 
probable legal penalties and the likelihood that they will 
be caught. If they believe that the legal penalty 
threatens more pain than the probable gain produced by the 
crime then they will not commit the crime. Their 
calculation is based on their own experience with the 
criminal punishment, their knowledge of what punishment is 
imposed by law, and their awareness of what punishment has 
been given to apprehended offenders in the past" (Akers & 
Sellers, p. 18).
The above definition pertains to the severity aspect 
of deterrence theory. The certainty and celerity 
principles of the theory states that "...in order to deter, 
the punishment for crime must be swift and certain.
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Celerity refers to the swiftness with which criminal 
sanctions are applied after the commission of crime" (Akers 
& Sellers, p. 19) .
According to the theory deterrence operates through 
specific and general deterrence. Specific deterrence 
states that "...apprehended and punished offenders will 
refrain from committing crimes if they are certainly caught 
and severely punished...general deterrence...punishment of 
offenders serves as an example to those in the general 
public who have not yet committed a crime, instilling in 
them enough fear of state punishment to deter them from 
crime" (Zimring, 1971; Zimring & Hawkins, 1973).
Deterrence theory fits in with those who commit 
healthcare fraud. Healthcare professionals will outweigh 
the punishment of getting caught with that of the potential 
gain. If the punishment is not too severe then that is 
when the crime occurs. Since healthcare fraud has a low 
risk of apprehension and a high chance of reward healthcare 
professionals will commit the crime after rationalizing the 
punishment to the reward.
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Types of Fraud—Terms of the Crime
Lovitky (1997, p. 42-44) lists several types of fraud 
concerning fee-for-service payment methods:
• Overutilization- "Providing unnecessary services...Fraud 
may occur when more services are provided than are 
medically necessary or when services not provided are 
billed".
• Upcoding- "Assigning a Current Procedure Terminology
(CPT) code that reflects a higher level of service 
than actually was provided".
• Billing for services not provided- "Perhaps the
simplest form of health care fraud. . . the only issue
to be resolved is whether the bill was submitted 
intentionally or through oversight".
Fraud types in managed care systems differ greatly 
according to Lovitky (p.44) as well.
• Failing to provide necessary services- "Managed care.
. . rendered by professionals. . . paid on a
capitulation basis". Fraud happens when the 
professional does not provide the services to the 
person thus endangering his or her health and is often 
"viewed as a theft of taxpayer dollars". The longer 
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the person is treated the more taxpayer money is put 
in.
• Filing false cost reports- "Cost reports...filled by 
providers who are paid under Medicare Part A...These 
costs must be filled in accordance with the Health 
Care Financing Administration regulations that are 
designed to ensure that only allowable costs are 
charged to the government. . . Distinguishing an
unallowable cost as an allowable cost" is the essence 
of false cost reports fraud.
Payne (1995) states there are two types of offenses 
generally found against Medicaid which have to do with 
intent. These two definitions separate the line between 
fraud and abuse. "Medicaid fraud includes those fraudulent 
acts where intent is present" (Geis, Jesilow, Pontell, & 
O'Brien, 1985, p. 831). Towery and Sharfstein (1978) state 
Medicaid abuse involves those offenses where intent is not 
present.
Prescription Fraud
Payne (1997) examined 292 cases of prescription fraud 
as prosecuted by Medicaid Fraud Control Units. The most 
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common offenses in prescription fraud were generic 
substitution, short-counting, and filling prescriptions 
without a refill. The majority of the offenders were the 
pharmacists themselves. What kind of harm does 
prescription fraud cause the health care system, the 
individual, and society?
Pharmacists fill 1.6 billion prescriptions a year in 
the United States (Wivell & Wilson, 1994). With so many 
prescriptions being filled one would assume that defrauding 
the system would be easy and overlooked. Once again, with 
prescription fraud the system being attacked is Medicaid. 
The fraud occurs because people do not believe that their 
pharmacist is going to do anything that would hurt them. 
After all, it is the pharmacist who is responsible for 
creating the medications that keep so many alive and well 
so why would fraud take place? Ford (1992) states that 
Americans have generally seen the pharmacist and his or her 
industry as a trustworthy one. From 1984 to 1994 the 
pharmacy was rated as the most honest and ethical 
occupation (McAnney & Moor, 1994). Because of this trust 
it is easy for the pharmacist to commit fraud.
The previous terms apply in prescription fraud as well 
but with a slightly different context. When a pharmacist 
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upcodes.he or she is filling the prescription with the 
cheaper generic drug but billing for the brand name drug. 
Phantom billing is when the pharmacist bills for a drug 
that was never prescribed to the recipient while double 
billing deals with the billing of more than one insurance 
company for only one set of instructions. Kickbacks are 
when the pharmacist receives or gives funds in exchange for 
referrals (Payne, 1997).
Prescription fraud attacks the Medicaid system by 
depleting money out of it. Pontell et al (1982) states 
that prescription fraud takes away from the efficiency of 
the system, thus resulting in cutbacks in the program 
because of the lack of funds. Once the defrauders have 
taken the money it is hard to replenish the money. The 
individual is harmed because when the pharmacist gives a 
cheaper version of the medication instead of what is 
prescribed the effects can alter the health of the 
individual (Payne, 1997).
Strategies to Combat Healthcare Fraud
Just as predicted by the Payne study the health care 
industry is now beginning to feel the effects of fraud and 
realize its implications. Companies as well as the 
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government have recently started a concentrated effort 
against fraud through different strategies. Schreiber et 
al (2002) states that the government has decided to 
strengthen established statutes as well as creating new 
laws to help fight the growing fraud problem. This is the 
government response in statutes and laws according to 
Schreiber et al (2002).
Medicaid False Claims Statute
This statute states that there are criminal penalties 
for the making of false statements or representations in 
respect to payment or benefit claims or disposal of assets. 
This statute is for federal health care programs and 
carries a fine of $25,000 or less, five years or less of 
prison time, or both (see Appendix A).
Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute
This is an extensive statute covering any form of 
remuneration. Punishments for breaking this statute are a 
fine of $25,000 or less, prison for up to five years, or 
both (see Appendix B).
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Stark Amendments
These amendments are also known as the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1989 and 1993. These acts prohibit 
physicians from sending patients to clinics or laboratories 
where the physician has a financial interest. The 1993 act 
expands upon the 1989 act. Penalties in violation of the 
act are first, claims filed for service in violation of the 
law results in a non-payment. Second, money must be 
refunded in a proper amount of time if money was taken in 
violation of the law. Third, a fine of up to $15,000 will 
be imposed as well as exclusion from Medicaid and Medicare 
programs (Schreiber, Prasow, and Martin, 2002) .
Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA)
Perhaps the most important government law passed is 
the Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996. This act is the first stable source of funding to 
attack fraud. It has expanded the definition of kickback 
so that all health care programs are included. This act 
also regulates private health care and has given the 
government more prosecution power in both state and federal 
realms. It has also allowed "law enforcement personnel to 
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employ administrative subpoenas, civil forfeiture, and 
injunctive relief, and it ratcheted up the sanctions for 
violating program requirements" (Hyman, 2002).
HIPPA has also "increased civil monetary penalties, 
added new offenses that trigger permissive or mandatory . 
exclusion from Medicare, specified minimum periods of 
exclusion, broadened the group of individuals who could be 
sanctioned in all of these ways, and imposed stiffed 
penalties for violating the new-health-care specific 
criminal statutes" (Hyman, 2002).
This act has four main focuses. It is illegal for:
• "Anyone to knowingly and willingly defraud any 
healthcare benefit program or to obtain by means 
of false representations any money or property of 
a healthcare benefit program,
• Make false statements which criminalizes any 
false or fictitious statements in any matter 
involving a healthcare benefit program,
• Embezzle, convert, or steal any funds, property, 
or assets of a healthcare benefit program, or
18
• Obstruct, delay, prevent, or mislead the 
investigation of federal healthcare offenses" 
(HIPAA of 1996).
Penalties for felonies include a fine dependent on the 
extent of damages and five years maximum in prison. If 
someone is caused serious bodily injury during the crime 
then the penalty is twenty years maximum in prison. If the 
crime has caused death then the penalty is life in prison 
HIPPA does have its opponents though. According to 
Sparrow, not one provider group showed support for it when 
it came out, especially the home health lobby and the 
American Hospital Association. In 1997 the Office of 
Inspector General found that 40 percent of payments made in 
respect to home health claims should not have been paid and 
that many of the patients did not even fit the definition 
of homebound. This forced the federal government to put a 
moratorium on admission to home health agencies in respect 
to the Medicare program. This would later be overturned 
with pressure from the National Association for home care 
along with its political allies.
Even though powerful laws may be enacted the agencies 
will still try to find a way around them. With money and 
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political forces behind the agencies it will be a tough 
fight to control healthcare fraud.




Laws and statutes on the federal level have been 
examined so far but states have ways to combat medical 
fraud as well. The Medical Board of California and the 
Board of Chiropractic Examiners each publish their own 
Manual of Model Disciplinary Orders and Disciplinary 
Guidelines. This is a manual of business and professional 
codes (B&P codes) that relate to medical fraud and other 
non-fraud medical crimes. It is important to note that 
medical fraud on all levels hurt government, healthcare 
programs, and taxpayers.
, Crimes that fall under the category of fraud are 
misleading advertising, failure to maintain adequate 
records, dishonesty, procuring license by fraud, making 
false statements or alteration of medical records, and 
fictitious name violation. These crimes are fraud crimes 
because they deal with acts of dishonesty. The maximum 
punishment for all of these crimes is revocation of 
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license. The minimum punishment for all of these crimes, 
except dishonesty and fictitious name violation, is stayed 
revocation and 5 years probation. Dishonesty covers stayed 
revocation and 5 to 7 years probation. Fictitious name 
violation covers stayed revocation and one year probation. 
The punishments for these crimes differ for chiropractors. 
Stayed revocation is still a minimum punishment but the 
probation time is considerable less. Revocation is still 
the maximum.
Non-Fraud Crimes in the Healthcare Industry
Whereas healthcare fraud may be the healthcare crime 
most focused on there are other ways medical professionals 
break the law. There are many crimes in the healthcare 
industry that do not fall under the fraud category. The 
non-fraud crimes are as follows: "medication errors, 
diagnosis failures, negligent supervision, delayed 
treatment, failure to obtain consent, lack of proper 
credentialing or technical skill, unexpected death, 
lastrogenic injury, nosocomial and wound infections, pain 
and suffering, emotional distress, or lack of teamwork and 
communication" (Glabman, 2004).
21




Excessive prescribing or prescribing without a prior 
examination, excessive treatments, mental or physical 
illness, prescribing to addicts, general unprofessional 
conduct, gross negligence, repeated negligent acts, and 
incompetence all fall under the category of non-fraud 
crimes. This is so because these are crimes in which the 
healthcare professional is not necessarily showing 
dishonesty, but rather, a lack of knowledge. The maximum 
punishment for all of these crimes is revocation of 
license. The minimum punishment is stayed revocation and 5 
years probation. It is important to note that in fraud and 
non-fraud crimes, the punishments that fall in between the 
maximum and minimum punishments vary according to crime. 
As with fraud crimes, the punishments for non-fraud crimes 
concerning chiropractors are different. Probation time is 
less for chiropractors but the minimum and maximum 
punishments concerning revocation are the same.
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Research Questions
Healthcare fraud and non-fraud healthcare crimes are
major problems within the healthcare industry. The study
used the business and professional codes that pertained to
fraud and non-fraud crimes rather than the federal
statutes. This was so because on the state level many of
the crimes listed above match the crimes on the federal
level. These are the research questions this study'
examined follows:
la) Is state region related to fraud? lb) Is state
region not related to non-fraud? 2) Is state region
related to type of punishment (i.e., education, loss,
community, supervision, and others)? 3) Do surgeons and
physicians commit individual offenses more than others. 4)
Is type of offense (i.e., fraud and non-fraud) related to
type of doctor? 5) Is type of individual punishment
related to type Are the type of punishments





The sample was collected through the
www.medbd.ca.gov/pubs Actionrept.htm and through the
www.chiro.ca.gov/enforcement website. The 
www.medbd.ca.gov/pubs_Actionrept.htm site contains action 
reports of doctors who have broken business and 
professional codes in the state of California. The 
www.chiro.ca.gov/enforcement website is the site that 
contains decision action resumes of chiropractors who have 
broken business and professional codes in the state of 
California. The Medical Board of California Action reports 
give the name of the medical professional, city of 
practice, code or codes broken, the crime or crimes, and 
the punishment or punishments (see Appendix C). The 
decision action resume contains the chiropractor's name, 
city of practice, codes broken, crime committed, and 
penalty (see Appendix D).
The sampling criteria consisted of healthcare 
professionals and chiropractors who have committed 
healthcare fraud and non-fraud crimes. The healthcare 
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fraud and non-fraud categories contained crimes that fell 
under those two headings. The action reports fell between 
August 1, 2004 to July 31, 2005. The decision action 
resumes also fell in the same time period. The sampling 
criteria consisted of physicians and surgeons, 
psychologists, podiatrists, physician assistants, and 
chiropractors. These were the healthcare professionals 
that have been recorded into the action reports and 
decision action resumes. The total sample population 
totaled 212.
Data Collection
The database was created out of information from the 
action reports and the Manual of Model Disciplinary Orders 
and Disciplinary Guidelines from the Medical Board of 
California (see Appendix E) and the Manual of Model 
Disciplinary Orders and Disciplinary Guidelines from the 
Board of Chiropractic Examiners (see Appendix F). 
Variables that were collected from the action reports and 
decisions action resumes respectively were physicians & 
surgeons, psychologists, podiatrists, physician assistants, 
chiropractors, type of offense, the punishment or 
punishments that were handed out, and the city in which the 
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healthcare professional is practicing, and code or codes 
broken. Variables that were collected from the Manual of 
Model Disciplinary Orders and Disciplinary Guidelines from 
the Medical Board of California and the Board of 
Chiropractic Examiners were maximum punishments, minimum 
punishments.
The data was collected through unobtrusive research. 
Unobtrusive research is a "method of studying social 
behavior without affecting it" (Babbie, 2005, p. 327). The 
study used the unobtrusive research method of analysis of 
existing statistics. The bulk of the data came from the 
California Medical Board Action Reports and the California 
Medical Board Manual of Model Disciplinary Orders and 
Disciplinary Guidelines as well as the Board of 
Chiropractic Examiners decision action resumes and the 
Manual of Model Disciplinary Orders and Disciplinary 
Guidelines from the Board of Chiropractic Examiners.
As is common in the analysis of existing statistics 
the unit of analysis will not be the individual (Babbie, p. 
342). Babbie (p. 342) states that in Durkheim's study he 
had to work with the political-geographical units of 
countries, regions, states, and cities. The study used the 
units of medical professionals, codes broken, punishments, 
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and cities the medical professional works in. All of these 
units will not look at one individual but a host of them.
Instruments
Once the data was collected it was put into an Excel 
spreadsheet. The Excel spreadsheet was then converted into 
an SPSS spreadsheet for data analysis. By using an Excel 
spreadsheet the data was organized into categories for 
comparisons.
Limitations
One of the limitations of the study revolved around 
validity and reliability. Problems that arise in question 
to validity are whether the existing data covers exactly 
what the researcher is interested in and that the 
researcher's measurements may not be altogether valid 
(Babbie, p. 242). Babbie (p. 242) states that this can be 
solved through logical reasoning and replication. The 
study did not have validity problems because the data 
matched what the researcher is examining.
Problems of reliability in the use of existing 
statistics rise up in terms of the "statistics themselves" 
(Babbie, 2005, p. 343). In respect to the study the 
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reliability problem was in the cases themselves. Even 
though the action report contains cases for a year it was 
not known if these are all of the cases. Only the medical 
professionals who were caught appear in the action reports. 
It was not known how many got away with breaking the codes 
or if every case was put in the action reports or if the 
number of cases for the year represents the true number of 
the amounts of cases.
The study faced the same reliability problems as 
researchers have had with any research concerned with 
record keeping. The action reports have to be kept and 
organized either by computer or people. This created a 
problem because it was not known to what extent if anything 
was left out or if anything was increased dramatically in 
respect to the information inserted into the action 
reports.
Babbie (p. 343) states that the best way to protect 
research from this problem is to be aware of it. As long 
as the researcher knows that reliability problems can arise 
in the use of existing statistics then it can be dealt 
with. Babbie (p. 343) states that logical reasoning and 
replication can help the researcher cope with the problem.
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The sample also posed some limitations. Only five 
healthcare professional groups will be looked at. This 
meant that an overall view of healthcare professionals will 
not be given. Many healthcare professional categories were 
not included.' Another limitation was the use of the 
California business & professional codes only. This was a 
limitation because it will only give a state of California 
perspective of the problem. • Even though it was a 
limitation in respect to the problem on a national level 
the categories of fraud and non-fraud crimes that the 
Medical Board of California and the Board of Chiropractic 
Examiners of California uses do closely match with fraud 





The chapter reports on the results. For this study t- 
tests and analysis of variance were used. Two frequency 
tables were constructed. Table 4.1 summarizes the number
of offenses. Table 4.2 summarizes the number of
punishments. The tests performed will be used to explore
the research questions. la) Is state region related to
fraud? lb) Is state region not related to non-fraud?
2) Is state region related to type of punishment (i.e.,
education, loss, community, supervision, and others)? 3)
Do surgeons and physicians commit individual offenses more
than others. 4) Is type of offense (i.e., fraud and non-
fraud) related to type of doctor? 5) Is type of individual 
punishment related to type of doctor? 6) Are the type of 
punishments related to type of doctor?
Type of Doctors
Types of doctor were separated into surgeon/physician
(n=180), podiatrist (n=3), physician assistant (n=7), 
psychologist (n=2), and chiropractor (n=20). The doctor 
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variables were recoded into two groups. The two groups 
were named surgeon/physician (n=180, 84.9%) and others 
(n=32, 15.1%) for a total sample number (n=212).
Tri-Region
Thirty California counties from the action reports 
were used in the study. These 30 categories were recoded 
into 3 groups: Southern California, Northern California, 
and Central California. In the Southern California group 
there were 149 offenders (70.3%). In the Northern 
California group there were 52 offenders (24.5%). In the 
Central California group there were 11 offenders (5.2%). 
The large differences in the Southern California number 
compared to those of the Northern California and Central 
California groups could be due to population. Southern 
California contains Los Angeles (pop. 3,844,829) and San 
Diego (pop. 1,255,540, two cities with a substantial number 
of people. In the study many of the cities were from the 
Southern California region. If the combined population of 
San Diego and Los Angeles are added to the rest of the 
Southern California cities used then they will easily 
outnumber those used for Northern and Central California.
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Offenses and Punishments
Table 1 summarizes the number of offenses.
Table 1.
Number of Offenses Committed.





















Number of Offenses Committed-continued.






















Number of Offenses Committed-continued.


















Number of Offenses Committed-continued.


















Number of Offenses Committed-continued.


















Number of Offenses Committed-continued.
Number of Offenses Frequency Percent
Lack of Teamwork or
Communication
0 209 98.6








Negligence (*=1.02) occurred the most out of all the 
offenses. Incompetence (*=.42) and failure to maintain 
records (*=.37) occurred frequently as well. None of these 
offenses fall under the fraud category. Under fraud 
offenses billings fraud (*=.16) and dishonesty (*=.16) 
occurred most frequently.


























Number and Type of Punishments-continued.



















Number and Type of Punishments-continued.






















Number and Type of Punishments-continued.
















The punishments that occurred most frequently were
courses (*=.94), revocation (*=.49), monitor (*=.22),
Probation (*=.43), payback (*=.46), programs (*=.40), and 
other punishments (*=.96).
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Testing the Research Questions
• la) Is State Region Related to Fraud?
• lb) Is State Region Not Related to Non-fraud?
State region was tested with the variables fraud and 
non-fraud in an analysis of variance test. Fraud consists 
of all individual fraud crimes as found in Table 1 (i.e., 
prescription fraud, records fraud, billings fraud, 
advertising fraud, kickbacks, overutilization, license 
fraud, dishonesty, and insurance fraud). Non-fraud 
consists of all non-fraud crimes found in Table 1 
(Negligence, unprofessional conduct, lack of an 
examination, failure to obtain consent, incompetence, 
violating statutes or acts, lack of credentialing or skill, 
failure to maintain records, lack of teamwork or 
communication, and others). The results (table 3) reveal 
that state region is not related to fraud (F.99, p=.42). 
State region is not related to non-fraud (F=1.15, p=.33) 
either. Research question la was not supported; state 
region is not related to fraud. Research question lb was 
supported; state region is not related to non-fraud.
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Table 3.













2) Is State Region Related to Type of Punishment (i.e., 
Education, Loss, Community, Supervision, and Others)?
The original punishments in table 2 were all recoded 
into five variables. Courses, programs, and exams were 
recoded into education punishments. Prohibited, 
suspension, and revocation were recoded into the loss 
punishments. Payback, probation, and community service 
were recoded into community punishments. Record 
maintenance, supervision, monitor, and permission were
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recoded into overseeing punishments. An analysis of 
variance test was then conducted on state region by the new 
variables education punishments, loss punishments, 
community punishments, overseeing punishments, and other 
punishments (Table 4) to see whether state region is 
related to type of punishment.
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Table 4.



















Within Groups ■ .48 .29 .75
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Table 4.














.96 . 11 .95
Education punishments (F=2.70, p=.O2) reached 
significance. State region was only related to education 
punishments. Research question 2 was not supported. For 
research question 2 to be supported state region needed to 
be related to each of the type of punishments.
3) Do Surgeons and Physicians Commit Individual Offenses 
More than Others.
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A t-test analysis was conducted on to explore whether 
surgeon/physician commit individual offenses more than 
others. Table 5 summarizes the findings from the analysis.
Table 5.









Surgeon/Physician . 16 .42
Others .09 .39
. 84 . 40
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Table 5.

























T-test for Surgeon/Physician and. Others by Variables for
Individual Offenses-continued.



































































T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Variables for
Individual Offenses-continued.
Failure to Obtain






























The most common offenses were billings fraud, 
overutilization, license fraud, insurance fraud, 
negligence, failure to maintain records, and incompetence. 
Billings fraud was committed by others (*=.31) more than 
surgeon/physician (*=.01). Overutilization was committed by 
others (*=.13) more than surgeon/physician (*=.02). License 
fraud was committed by others (*=.19) more than 
surgeon/physician (*=.04). Insurance fraud was committed by 
others (*=.31) more than surgeon/physicians (*=.03). 
Negligence was committed by surgeon/physician (*=1.11) more 
than others (*=.50). Surgeon/physician (*=.42) committed 
failure to maintain records more than others (*=.09).
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.Incompetence was committed more by surgeon/physician (*=.45) 
more than others (*=.22). Research question 3 was not 
supported. In the seven offenses that reached significance 
four of them were committed by others while three of them 
were committed by surgeon/physician.
4) Is Type of Offense (i.e.,- Fraud and Non-fraud) Related 
to Type of Doctor?
A T-test was also conducted to see whether type of 
offense (i;e., fraud and non-fraud is related to type of 
doctor. Table 6 explores the results.
54
Table 6.
T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Fraud and Non- 
fraud.











Fraud (p=.00) and non- fraud (p=.00) both reached
significance. Between surgeon/physician and other it was 
others (*= 1.41) that committed fraud more often. 
Surgeon/physician (*= 2.42) committed non-fraud offenses 
more often. Research question 4 was supported by the test; 
the type of offense is related to the type of doctor. Fraud 
is related to others while non-fraud is related to 
surgeon/physician.
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5) Is Type of Individual Punishment Related to Type of 
Doctor?
A T-Test analysis was conducted to see whether type of 
individual punishment is related to type of doctor. Table 
7 examines the results of the test.
Table 7.
















































Others . 81 . 40
-4.09 . 00
Probation













T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Type of
Individual Punishments-continued.





















T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Type of
Individual Punishments-continued.




Surgeon/Physician . 99 .36
Others .78 . 61
2.74 ,.01
The most common punishments were courses (p=.01), 
community service (p=.00), monitor (p=.01), supervision (p= 
.00), revocation (p= .00), payback, programs (p=.00), 
suspension (p=.00), exam (p=.00), and other punishments 
(p=.01). The results support research question 5. Each of 
the significant punishments were related to certain types 
of doctors.
Surgeon/physician (*= 1.02) received courses. Others (* 
= .,09) received community service., Surgeon/physician (*= 
.25) received monitor. Others (*= .16) received 
supervision. Others (*= .81) received revocation. Others
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(*= .75) received payback. Surgeon/physician (*= .47) 
received programs. Others (*= .31) received suspension. 
Others (*= .76) received exam. Others (*= .78) other 
punishments.
6) Are the Type of Punishments Related to Type of Doctor?
A t-test was conducted to see whether the type of 
punishment is related to the type of doctor (Table 8).
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Table 8.










Others . 97 1.23
2.12 .04
Loss Punishments
Surgeon/Physician . 62 .77



















Others .88 . 87
-.54 .59
Other Punishments
Surgeon/Physician . 99 . 36
Others .78 . 61
2.74 .01
The most common type of punishments were education 
punishments (p=.O4), loss punishments (p=.00), community 
punishments (p=.00), and other punishments (p=.01). 
Surgeon/physician (*= 1.51) received education punishments 
over others. Others (*= 1.19) received loss punishments 
over surgeon/physician. Others (*= .84) received community
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punishments over surgeon/physician. Surgeon/physician (*= 
.99) received other punishments over others. Research 
question 6. was supported; the type of punishment was 
related to type of doctor.
Number of Doctors in California
212 cases were examined in the study. In order to see
the ratio of cases to the number of doctors the number of 
doctors- in California had to be found. Some of the figures 
taken were from the time period of the study while others 
came from different years a little before or after the time 
period the study focused on. During 2004-2005 California 
had between 92,852 in 2004 to 94,546 in 2005 
(http://ca.rand.org/stats/health/physicians.html). In 1993 
chiropractors in California numbered 2,830 and went up to 
4,080 in 2004. Physician assistants numbered 5,110 in 1993 
and went up to 6,330 to 2005. Podiatrists numbered 2,100 
in 2003 while psychologists (clinical, counselors, and 




What these numbers show is that with surgeons and 
physicians fraud is not widespread when compared to the 
number of cases in the study. In terms of the others 
variable their number in the study is small but so are the 
numbers of those employed in those professions in 






The tests conducted supported research questions lb,
4, 5, and 6. Research questions la, 2, and 3 were not 
supported by the tests. State region was not related to 
fraud (la) nor was state region related to non-fraud (lb). 
State region was not related to type of punishment (2). 
Surgeon/physician did not commit individual offenses more 
than those in the others variable (3), it was found to be 
the opposite. The type of offense, when put into fraud and 
non-fraud variables, were related to type of doctor (4). 
Surgeon/physician committed non-fraud offenses while other 
doctors committed fraud offenses. The type of individual 
punishment was found to be related to type of doctor (5). 
The type of punishment group was also found to be related 
to type of doctor (6).
Policy Implications
The purpose of these tests were to examine the overall 
severity of fraud and how it was punished within the 
medical industry by the Medical Board of California and the
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Chiropractor Board of California. In the study the 
majority of the sample were the surgeon/physician variable 
group. Even though this was, surgeon/physician committed 
non-fraud offenses and in the individual offenses crimes 
such as incompetence and negligence were committed by the 
same group. The much smaller others variable were found to 
commit non-fraud offenses with individual offenses such as 
billings fraud and insurance fraud committed by the same 
group.
What this means is that perhaps surgeons and 
physicians are not looking to commit fraud. The study 
suggests that the specialists (found in the others group.) 
are the ones looking to commit fraud. If this is the case 
then it would seem to be that the Medical Board of 
California is taking the necessary steps to combat medical 
fraud. The tests used to examine punishments support this. 
For example, courses were given to surgeon/physician while 
payback was given to others. Even when the individual 
punishments were grouped the results were similar. For 
example, education courses were given to surgeon/physician 
while loss punishments were given to others. The 
Chiropractic Board of California, on the other hand, needs 
to find a way to combat fraud. With chiropractors making 
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up the majority of the others group and fraud being 
prevalent among the others group the Chiropractic Board is 
not doing enough to reduce the problem.
For policy purposes, tougher regulations against fraud 
would help the problem but it may not help in decreasing 
the problem. In this study fraud was committed by others. 
Originally, others consisted of chiropractors, podiatrists, 
physician's assistants, and psychologists before being 
recoded into others. Except for physician's assistants, 
the other three are specialists. What is unique in this 
study is that the others group is small in sample size but 
was still found to commit fraud more than 
surgeon/physician. A possible policy action would be to 
regulate these types of doctors more closely.
One way of doing this would be to allow agencies like 
the Medical Board of California and the Chiropractic Board 
of California to hand out tougher punishments for fraud 
related offenses rather than only the customary restitution 
or revocation of license. The problem with revoking a 
fraud offender's license is that a non-fraud offender, with 
enough non-fraud offenses against him or her, can have 
their license revoked as well. The punishments for fraud
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offenses and non-fraud offenses need to be better defined 
and tougher on fraud offenses.
Theoretical Implications
Deterrence theory was used to explain why doctors 
would commit fraud. Deterrence theory states "...that 
actions are taken and decisions are made by persons in the 
rational exercise of free will. All individuals choose to 
obey or violate the law by a rational calculation of the 
risk of the pain versus potential pleasure derived from an 
act. In contemplating a criminal act, they take into 
account the probable legal penalties and the likelihood 
that they will be caught. If the'y believe that the legal 
penalty threatens more pain than the probable gain produced 
by the crime then they will not commit the crime. Their 
calculation is based on their own experience with the 
criminal punishment, their knowledge of what punishment is 
imposed by law, and their awareness of what punishment has 
been given to apprehended offenders in the past" (Akers & 
Sellers, p. 18) .
Deterrence theory would help explain why others 
committed fraud. The doctors in that group see the reward 
as being greater than the punishment. Punishments given to 
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the fraud offenders in the study are not harsh enough to 
warrant caution for the offenders. As stated earlier, if a 
non-fraud offender commits enough offenses he or she can 
face the same punishments that a fraud offender can. 
Because of this fraud is a tempting offense in a weakly 
regulated industry.
Even though Deterrence Theory could be used to explain 
fraud offenses it does not actually apply to fraud offenses 
overall committed in the study. This is so because the 
majority of the sample (surgeon/physician) did not commit 
fraud offenses most often. Non-fraud was committed more 
often. This would indicate that the risk for fraud is 
greater than the reward, going against Deterrence Theory.
Conclusion
In conclusion, more research in this area is needed. 
The database was strictly constructed from the Medical 
Board of California and Chiropractic Board of California 
and therefore, only a state view is presented. At the time 
of this study there was no known database detailing the 
offenses and punishments. Constructing a larger database 
would require massive research and time but it would 
present a more concise picture of how great the fraud 
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problem really is. Healthcare fraud is a major problem 
according to the sources cited earlier and therefore, more 




MEDICAID FALSE CLAIMS STATUTE
72
Medicaid False Claims Statute
Criminal Penalties for Acts Involving Medicare or 
State Health Care Programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320(a)7(b) 
criminalizes the making of false statements or 
representations in connection with any applications for 
claim of benefits or payment, or disposal of assets under a 
federal health care program. Penalties of being convicted 
through this statute include a fine no larger that $25,000, 






"Whoever knowingly and willingly solicits or receives 
any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) 
directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in 
kind (A) in return for referring an individual to a person 
for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any 
item or service for which payment may be made in whole or 
in part under title XVIII or a State health care program, 
or (B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or 
arranging for or recommending, purchasing, leasing, or 
ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which 
payment may be made in whole or in part under title XVIII 
or a State health care program, shall be guilty of a felony 
and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than 
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or 
both. Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any 
remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) 
directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in 
kind to any person to induce such person (A) to refer an 
individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for 
the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may 
be made in whole or in part under title XVIII, or a State 
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health care program, or (B) to purchase, lease, order, or 
arrange for or recommend purchasing, leasing, or ordering 
any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may 
be made in whole or in part under title XVIII or a State 
health care program, shall be guilty of a felony and upon 
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 or 
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both" (Medicaid 
Anti-Kickback Statute as found in the Medicare and Medicaid 
Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987) .
APPENDIX C
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77
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS: August 1, 2004 to October 31, 2004
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS
ABDELAZIZ, MOHAMED I., M.D. (A37224) 
Valrico, FL
B&P Code §§141(a), 2305. Stipulated Decision. 
Disciplined by Florida for failing to timely and 
adequately diagnose an abnormal fetal heart rate 
pattern; review the fetal monitor strip; adequately 
monitor the patient; and attempt intrauterine 
resuscitation in the care and treatment of 1 patient. 
Surrender of license. September 16, 2004
ABRAHAMIAN, AZNIV A., M.D. (A50782) 
North Hollywood, CA
B&P Code §2234. Stipulated Decision. No admissions 
but charged with prescribing or dispensing medication 
without a good faith prior examination. Physician 
completed a prescribing practices course and an 
ethics course. Public Letter of Reprimand.
August 23, 2004
ACEVES, JOSE ADELELMO, M.D. (A48529) 
Whittier, CA
B&P Code §2234(b). Stipulated Decision. Committed 
acts of gross negligence and unprofessional conduct 
by failing to promptly treat a 73-year-old patient who 
had been diagnosed with a myocardial infarction. The 
patient refused treatment and was allowed to leave 
the office without being provided adequate care, 
instructions and referral by calling 911. Public Letter 
of Reprimand. August 4, 2004
ADAMS, JOHN SINDOS, M.D. (AFE45632) 
Ooltewah, TN
B&P Code §§141 (a), 2234, 2305. Stipulated Decision. 
Disciplined by Georgia for failing to complete the 
required board profile in a timely manner and 
indicating on a renewal application that the profile had 
been completed, when it was not. Public Letter of 
Reprimand. October 19, 2004
ADLER, STEPHEN CHARLES, M.D. (G17393) 
Moline, IL
B&P Code §§141(a), 2232(a), 2305. Stipulated 
Decision. Disciplined by New York for conviction of 
criminal charges involving indecent solicitation of a 
child. Physician also required to register as a sex 
offender. Revoked. October 22, 2004
Explanation of Disciplinary Language and Actions
? “Effective date of decision” — 
Example: “September 16, 2004*’ at 
the bottom of the summary means 
the date the disciplinary' decision 
goes into operation.
$ “Gross negligence” — An extreme 
deviation from the standard of
t practice.
‘Incompetence’* — Lack of 
knowledge or skills in discharging
■ professional obligations.
v “Judicial review is being 
| pursued” — The disciplinary 
| decision is being challenged through 
J the court system —Superior Court, 
| maybe Court of Appeal, maybe 
t State Supreme Court. The discipline 
. is currently in effect.
\ “Probationary License” — A
| conditional license issued to an 
applicant on probationary terms and
> conditions. This is done when good 
cause exists for denial of the license
' application.
“Probationary’ Terms and 
Conditions** — Examples: 
Complete a clinical training 
program. Take educational courses 
in specified subjects. Take a course 
in ethics. Pass an oral clinical exam. 
Abstain from alcohol and drugs. 
Undergo psychotherapy or medical 
treatment Surrender your DEA 
drug permit. Provide free services 
to a community facility.
“Public Letter of Reprimand’* -— 
A lesser form of discipline that can 
be negotiated for minor violations 
before the filing of formal charges 
(Accusations). The licensee is 
disciplined in the foim of a public 
letter.
“Revoked” — The license is 
canceled, voided, annulled, 
rescinded. The right to practice is 
ended.
“Revoked, stayed, 5 years i
probation on terms and conditions, r 
including 60 days suspension” — ♦
“Stayed” means the revocation is 
postponed, put off. Professional 
practice may continue so long as the 
licensee complies with specified 
probationary terms and conditions, 
which, in this example, includes 60 ?
days actual suspension from practice. ; 
Violation of probation may result in the < 
revocation that was postponed. *
“Stipulated Decision” — A form of 
plea bargaining. The case is negotiated ; 
and settled prior to trial. I
“Surrender” — To resolve a ?
disciplinary action, the licensee has ) 
given up his or her license — subject | 
to acceptance by the board. |
“Suspension from practice” — The i 
licensee is prohibited from practicing | 
for a specific period of time. |
Medical Board of California













Effective Date: September 3, 2004
Penalty: Revoked, stayed, 2 years probation, 
$814,000 in costs
Summary: Respondent violated Business and 
Professions Codes section 1000-10 
when he was convicted of Penal Code 
Sections 484 and 488 (petty theft).
Case No.: 2004-403
Dec/Stip: Stipulation




Effective Date: September 3,'2004
Penalty: Revoked, stayed, 5 years, $7,968 
in costs, CPA, 6 units in ethics, 
California law exam.
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Summary: Respondent engaged in inflated or 
fraudulent billing, he was convicted 
for Penal Code 550(a)(1).
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APPENDIX E
MANUAL OF MODEL DISCIPLINARY ORDER
AND DISCIPLINARY GUIDELINES
82
. State of California
State and Consumer Services Agency
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA











MANUAL OF MODEL DISCIPLINARY ORDERS 




GENERAL UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (B&P 2234), or
GROSS NEGLIGENCE [B&P 2234 (b)], or
REPEATED NEGLIGENT ACTS [B&P 2234(c)], or
INCOMPETENCE [B&P 2234(d)], or
FAILURE TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE RECORDS (B&P 2266)
Minimum penalty: Stayed revocation, 5 years probation
Maximum penalty: Revocation
J. Education course [14.]
2. Prescribing Practices Course (15)
3. Medical Record Keeping Course [16]
4. Ethics Course [17]
5. Clinical Training Program [19]
6. Oral or Written Examination [20] (preferably Condition Precedent)
7. Monitoring - Practice Billing [24]
8. Solo Practice [25]
9. Prohibited Practice [27]
DISHONESTY - Substantially related to the qualifications, functions or duties of a 
physician and surgeon and arising from or occurring during patient care, treatment, 
management or billing (B&P 2234(e)]
Minimum penalty: Stayed revocation, one year suspension at least 7 years probation 
Maximum penalty: Revocation.
1. Ethics Course [17]
2. Oral or Written Examination [20]
3. Psychiatric Evaluation [21]
4. Medical Evaluation [23]
5. Monitoring-Practice/Billing [24]
6. Solo Practice [25]
7. Prohibited Practice [27]
DISHONESTY - Substantially related to the qualifications, function or duties of a physician 
and surgeon but not arising from or occurring during patient care, treatment, management or 
billing [BP 2234 (e)|
Minimum penalty: Stayed revocation. 5 years probation
Maximum penalty: Revocation
1. Suspension of 60 days or more [4]
2. Ethics Course [17]
3. Psychiatric Evaluation [21]
4. Medical Evaluation [23]
5. Monitoring-Practice/Billing (if financial dishonesty or conviction of financial crime) [24]




MANUAL OF MODEL DISCIPLINARY ORDER AND
DISCIPLINARY GUIDELINES AS




























Intentionally or recklessly causing harm to the public
Habitual intemperance with drugs or alcohol
Conviction of a crime
Conviction involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption
Possession, distribution, or use of drugs
Commission of dishonest or fraudulent act related to duties or functions of license 
Aiding and abetting unlicensed activity’
Obtaining fee by fraud or deceit
Use of cappers or steerers
Fee for referrals
Business' and Professions Code
1054 Name of a chiropractic corporation
1055 Officers of chiropractic corporation not licensed as required in Professional 
Corporation Act
725 Excessive prescribing or treatment (for use in less egregious cases)
726 Sexual relations with patients (for use in less egregious cases)
810 False or fraudulent claims (for use in less egregious cases)
CATEGORY IV
Penalty: Revocation
Recommended for more egregious cases involving insurance fraud, sexual misconduct, 
excessive treatment. Revocation is also recommended when: I) respondent fails to file a notice 
of defense or to appear at a disciplinary hearing where the board has requested revocation in the 
accusation; 2) respondent violates the terms and conditions ol' probation from a previous 
disciplinary order; and 3) where prior discipline has been imposed, as progressive discipline 
unless respondent can demonstrate satisfactory evidence of rehabilitation.
California Code, of Regulations
316(a) Sexual misconduct
317(d) Excessive treatment
317(g) Conviction of a crime (involving insurance  fraud)







Dishonesty: when a doctor knowingly does something wrong 
without letting the patient knows of the deceit.
Monitor: when a doctor needs some kind of monitor to 
perform a procedure or act pertaining to his or her job. 
Supervision: when a doctor needs supervision to perform a 
procedure or act pertaining to his or her job.
Permission: when a doctor needs permission to perform a 
procedure or do an act pertaining to his or her job.
Loss punishments: punishments where some kind of loss is 
involved. Example would be revocation (having one's 
license revoked), loss of license, or suspension of 
license.
Community punishments: punishments dealing with giving back 
to the community or dealing with a community agency.
Examples would be paying restitution to a member of the 
community or having a probation officer.
Overseeing punishments: punishments dealing with the 
overseeing of a procedure or act pertaining to the job. 
Examples would be supervision or monitor.
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